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Abstract: The notion of exchangeability has been recognized in the causal
inference literature in various guises, but only rarely in the original Bayesian
meaning as a symmetry property between individual units in statistical in-
ference. Since the latter is a standard ingredient in Bayesian inference, we
argue that in Bayesian causal inference it is natural to link the causal model,
including the notion of confounding and definition of causal contrasts of in-
terest, to the concept of exchangeability. Here we relate the Bayesian notion
of exchangeability to alternative conditions for unconfounded inferences,
commonly stated using potential outcome variables, and define causal con-
trasts in the presence of exchangeability in terms of limits of posterior pre-
dictive expectations for further exchangeable units. We demonstrate that
this reasoning also carries over to longitudinal settings where parametric
inferences are susceptible to the so-called null paradox. We interpret the
paradox in terms of an exchangeability assumption made on too coarse a
scale.
Keywords and phrases: Bayesian inference, Causal inference, Confound-
ing, Exchangeability, Posterior predictive inference.
1. Introduction
The concept of exchangeability, due to de Finetti (1974), has profound philo-
sophical meaning to Bayesians. Recall that an infinite sequence of observable
random variables Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn, . . . is exchangeable if, for all finite n,
P (Y1, . . . , Yn) = P (Yρ(1), . . . , Yρ(n))
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for any permutation ρ(.) of the indices. This simple probabilistic definition plays
a central, even totemic, role in Bayesian inference; it leads to the definition
of ‘parameters’ as functions of infinite sequences of observable quantities, fa-
cilitates probability statements on future, yet unobserved, quantities based on
information contained in observed data, and justifies the use of the posterior dis-
tribution as the basis for statistical inference (e.g. Bernardo and Smith, 1994,
p. 173). However, recently, the terms ‘exchangeability’ or ‘conditional exchange-
ability’ have been increasingly used in the field of causal inference, where they
have gained a specific meaning relating to certain conditional independence
relationship between exposure (or treatment), potential outcomes and possi-
ble confounding variables, synonymous to part of the ‘ignorability’ assumption
as stated by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). In this paper we study the links
between the two uses of the term, and point out the common probabilistic
arguments underpinning them. Furthermore, we propose a fully Bayesian for-
mulation of causal inference based on exchangeable representations, including
Bayesian definitions of causal estimands. Our central thesis is that de Finetti’s
formulation of exchangeability is entirely sufficient to give a coherent framework
for causal inference, without the need to introduce special constructs (such as
potential outcomes), mathematical machinery (the do-operator) or additional
conditional independence assumptions.
1.1. Exchangeability and causal inference
A connection between the original probabilistic concept of exchangeability and
causal inference was first suggested by Lindley and Novick (1981, p. 51), al-
though the authors did not to pursue this further, citing difficulties in defini-
tion (presumably in purely probabilistic terms). This connection was pointed
out later by Greenland and Robins (1986) in the context of non-identifiability
of causal parameters due to confounding. However, in the causal inference
literature (e.g. Greenland, Robins and Pearl, 1999; Herna´n and Robins, 2006;
Greenland and Robins, 2009), ‘exchangeability’ has been interpreted in terms
of potential outcomes, instead of observable quantities, and the connection of
this concept to its Bayesian interpretation appears to have been lost. In this
paper we highlight the similarities between causal reasoning based on unit-level
exchangeability and the now more common formulation based on potential out-
comes, and demonstrate that under a deterministic special case the two inter-
pretations of causal inference are equivalent.
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We aim to provide a sequel to the classic account of Lindley and Novick
(1981) with the hindsight of the numerous developments that have taken place
in causal inference theory and methodology since. The utility of the concept of
exchangeability and the account of Lindley and Novick (1981) has been disputed
by Pearl (2009, p. 177–180) (see also Lindley, 2002), who argued that probabil-
ity theory alone is not adequate for providing a comprehensive framework for
causal reasoning (which, in fact, Lindley and Novick never attempted). Rather
than enter this debate, we concentrate on clarifying the connection between the
Bayesian notion of exchangeability and causal inference, using exchangeability
as basis of the ‘causal model’. A causal model is necessary to define the causal
contrast of interest, as well as to define the notion of confounding and identify
the conditions required for unconfounded inferences.
We follow the key insight of Lindley and Novick (1981, p. 45) that “inference
is a process whereby one passes from data on a set of units to statements about
a further unit”. Since we can only ever observe outcomes for any individual unit
under a single exposure pattern, it seems reasonable to base statistical inferences
about causal effects on an explicit assumption of ‘similarity’ (or more precisely,
indistinguishability) of the individual instances. To assume an exchangeable
structure is always appropriate after sufficient relevant information has been
included (Gelman et al., 2004, p. 6); however, what constitutes this sufficient
relevant information in causal inference settings often has to be decided based
on prior information alone, as noted by Greenland and Robins (2009). That is,
causal inferences from observational settings necessarily rely on prior informa-
tion regarding the causal mechanisms involved; the role of prior information can
be made explicit in Bayesian inference.
Several other authors have attempted to make connections between classical
statistical models and causal models. In particular Dawid (2000); Arjas and Parner
(2004); Chib (2007) have suggested that the potential outcomes notation is re-
dundant in Bayesian inference about causal contrasts, but similar arguments
have been made in the context of frequentist inferences. Baker (2013) gave
a probabilistic interpretation to confounding and collider biases. Many of the
formulations alternative to potential outcomes are based on introducing a hy-
pothetical ‘randomized’ or ‘experimental’ probability measure which is used to
formulate the causal quantity of interest (Dawid and Didelez, 2010; Røysland,
2011; Arjas, 2012; Saarela et al., 2015; Commenges, 2019). Inference then be-
comes a matter of linking the experimental measure to the observational one
thought to have generated the data, which involves assumptions about the ab-
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sence of unmeasured confounding. Other formulations are based on structural
definitions, where a deterministic relationship is assumed between observed and
latent variables (Commenges and Ge´gout-Petit, 2015; Ferreira, 2019).
The ‘no confounding’ assumption required for identification of the causal ef-
fect under these formulations is usually expressed in terms of latent variables, or
equivalence of certain components of the experimental and observational joint
distributions, termed by Dawid and Didelez (2010) as the ‘stability’ assumption.
Ferreira et al. (2015) framed a certain exchangeability property of the treatment
assignment mechanism as a ‘no confounding’ type assumption, but did not con-
nect it to Bayesian inference. We are not aware of exchangeability (in its original
meaning as a symmetry property of probability distributions) otherwise used as
a causal assumption; for example Dawid et al. (2016) used it as an inferential
assumption needed in addition to ‘no confounding’ type assumption. The objec-
tive of the present paper is to investigate exchangeability as a causal assumption
and link it to Bayesian causal inference, and further extend this reasoning to
longitudinal settings which introduce other biases in addition to confounding,
related to conditioning on intermediate variables. Similar to Ferreira (2019) we
adopt a structural model as this allows us to draw connections between the
different causal models, but with the focus on Bayesian causal inference.
1.2. Plan of this paper
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the causal interpreta-
tion of (conditional) exchangeability judgements at both the population- and
individual-level and relate this to causal reasoning based on potential outcomes;
conditional or partial exchangeability (see for example Bernardo and Smith,
1994, p. 169) is the assumption of exchangeability within subgroups specified by
common levels of further observable quantities. In Section 3 we give a Bayesian
definition of a marginal causal contrast and discuss parametric inference under
observational settings. In Section 4 we discuss the limitations of causal reasoning
based on exchangeability in a longitudinal setting involving unmeasured vari-
ables. Here under model mis-specification, lack of conditional exchangeability
corresponding to conditional distributions being modeled may manifest itself
in the form of the null paradox discussed by Robins and Wasserman (1997), in
which case the inferences from a conditional model may not be valid even under
the null hypothesis of no treatment effect. We conclude with a discussion in
Section 5.
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2. Exchangeability and ignorability
The central notion in causal inference is to obtain unconfounded inferences about
differences in (expected) response arising from different exposures, paralleling
the inferences available from a randomized experimental study, but to obtain
the inferences from observational data. In this section, we contrast Bayesian
formulations under the two types of data collection mechanism, and identify
the role of prior knowledge or assumptions about the relationships amongst the
variables.
2.1. Population-level exchangeability
To help fix ideas, we will first contrast the probabilistic notion of exchangeability
to its deterministic population-level counterpart discussed by Greenland and Robins
(1986) under a point treatment setting. Note that Robins and Greenland (1992)
extended this reasoning to intermediate variable settings; this is relevant to the
longitudinal setting which we will discuss in Section 4.1. We consider a hypo-
thetical study of the effect of initiation of antiretroviral therapy on CD4 cell
counts, conducted in a sample of n HIV patients. Our explanations are assisted
by the use of directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to clarify the underlying data gen-
erating mechanisms. In the Bayesian framework, we can regard a posited DAG
as encapsulating structural prior knowledge relating to the observable quanti-
ties. In this paper we use the terms ‘knowledge’, ‘information’ and ‘opinion’
interchangeably to describe the a priori-held subjective beliefs – both qualita-
tive and quantitative – of the experimenter. As a notational device, we will use
structural definitions to illustrate the link between the information encoded in
the DAG and the probability statements we are making.
Consider random sampling from an infinite super-population (or data gen-
erating mechanism) under an observational setting characterized by the con-
ditional independencies depicted in the DAG in Figure 1. Specifically, for i =
1, . . . , n, let the random variableXi represent a baseline CD4 cell count measure-
ment for an HIV-positive individual i, Zi represent the initiation of antiretroviral
therapy at the baseline time point, and Yi the CD4 cell count measurement after
sufficient time has passed since the baseline. Further, let Ui be a latent variable
representing the underlying immune status of individual i, some facet of which
could possibly be captured by Xi. We know that individuals with lower CD4
cell counts, Xi, are more likely to initiate treatment; due to the correlation be-
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Fig 1. The postulated data generating mechanism under the observational setting O. The
numbering corresponds to temporal ordering of the variables. The dashed arrow Zi −→ Yi is
not present under the null hypothesis of no treatment effect.
tween Ui and Xi, this further implies that those where poor underlying immune
function are more likely to initiate treatment. For notational simplicity, in this
section we take all random variables to be discrete-valued. Finally, following the
notation of Saarela et al. (2015), let O denote the prior information we have
on the (observational) study setting and the data generating mechanism. Based
on the context, we know for instance that lower baseline CD4 would increase
the probability of earlier treatment initiation under the observational setting.
Our aim is to study the effect of treatment initiation on the outcome. Suppose
that two subgroups of the sampled individuals A and B have been identified
retrospectively with Zi = 1 ∀ i ∈ A (the treated group) and Zi = 0 ∀ i ∈ B
(the untreated group). We let YA ≡ {Yi : i ∈ A} denote random vectors on
individuals from group A, with a similar definition for YB.
For causal considerations, central is now whether the groups A and B are
in some suitable sense similar, and thereby directly comparable. Without any
additional information on the treatment effect, or the observed values of the
variables, the previous description of the data generating process already implies
that this is not the case; group A is over-represented by individuals with low
baseline CD4 values and poorer prognosis, due to their underlying immune
function status, Ui. A numerical example demonstrating this is presented in
Appendix. Thus, a simple comparison in terms of the summary statistics, for
example t(yA) − t(yB) = y¯A − y¯B, would be confounded ; we formalize this
concept in Section 3 where we introduce an explicit causal estimand and its
estimator. Before that, we attempt to understand this non-comparability of the
groups through a probabilistic exchangeability statement between individuals
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representative of those groups.
2.2. Individual-level exchangeability
Consider now a comparison of two further individuals, j and k, known to have
been (non-experimentally) assigned to treatments Zj = 1 and Zk = 0, but
with the outcome yet to be observed. A question relevant to causal inferences
would now be whether the outcomes of these two individuals are exchangeable
(pairwise) under a hypothetical intervention to reverse their treatments; if so,
comparison of their outcomes under the actual treatment assignments would
be informative of the causal effect of the treatment. To express this thought
experiment, we take the outcome to be determined by the structural model
Yi = f(Zi, Xi, Ui), in which case the relevant exchangeability property can be
expressed as
P (Yj = yj , Yk = yk | Zj = 1, Zk = 0;O) (2.1)
≡ P (f(1, Xj, Uj) = yj, f(0, Xk, Uk) = yk | Zj = 1, Zk = 0;O)
= P (f(0, Xj, Uj) = yk, f(1, Xk, Uk) = yj | Zj = 1, Zk = 0;O)
for all (yj , yk). We emphasize that a statement such as (2.1) could usually only
be made on a subjective basis, conditional on information concerning the study
design and data generating mechanism. In addition, the causal question of inter-
est, including the role of the variables in the data generating mechanism, must
be stated a priori ; without this knowledge we would not know which exchange-
ability judgement is relevant for drawing causal inferences. Now (2.1) implies
for instance that
∑
y P (f(1, Xj, Uj) = yj , f(0, Xk, Uk) = y | Zj = 1, Zk = 0;O)
=
∑
y P (f(1, Xk, Uk) = yj, f(0, Xj, Uj) = y | Zj = 1, Zk = 0;O)
⇒ P (f(1, Xj, Uj) = yj | Zj = 1, Zk = 0;O)
= P (f(1, Xk, Uk) = yj | Zj = 1, Zk = 0;O),
that is, f(z,Xj, Uj) | (Zj = 1, Zk = 0)
d
= f(z,Xk, Uk) | (Zj = 1, Zk = 0) under
O. If we further assume that the treatment assignment of individual k is not
informative of the outcome of individual j and vice versa (cf. “no interference
between units”, Rubin, 1978; Lindley and Novick, 1981, p. 58) we have that
f(z,Xj, Uj) | (Zj = 1)
d
= f(z,Xk, Uk) | (Zk = 0) under O. Thus, (2.1) implies
that Zi ⊥ f(z,Xi, Ui) under O.
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Central to (2.1) for causal considerations is the extent to which group as-
signment can tell us about the other characteristics of the groups through the
a priori knowledge on the relationships between the variables. If the statement
(2.1) was true, the treatment and reference groups A and B, and the further,
similar, individuals j and k, would be directly comparable, implying that a com-
parison of the two groups through a suitable summary statistic, for instance
tA − tB = y¯A − y¯B would be free of confounding. However, exchangeability of
the units of inference implies that the labels of the units do not carry relevant in-
formation (e.g. Bernardo and Smith, 1994, p. 168), which is now clearly not the
case because of how the comparison was constructed: a priori we would expect
individual j to have lower baseline CD4 than k count based on the treatment
assignments.
On the other hand, the exchangeability property would apply under a hy-
pothetical completely randomized (experimental) setting in DAG 2, labeled
as E , which otherwise mirrors the observational setting so that the law Yi =
f(Zi, Xi, Ui) applies under both, but under which the treatments are assigned
so that Zi ⊥ (Xi, Ui) under E . This can be stated as the symmetry property
P (Yj = yj , Yk = yk | Zj = 1, Zk = 0; E) (2.2)
≡ P (f(1, Xj, Uj) = yj , f(0, Xk, Uk) = yk | Zj = 1, Zk = 0; E)
= P (f(0, Xj, Uj) = yk, f(1, Xk, Uk) = yj | Zj = 1, Zk = 0; E)
for all (yj , yk). This suggests that the causal estimand of interest should be
specified referring to the situation under the hypothetical experimental setting;
the problem of causal inference then involves making probability statements
about the estimand based on data collected under the observational setting
(Section 3).
As a side note, we could express an exchangeability statement in terms of the
observable variables as
P (Yj = yj , Yk = yk | Zj = 1, Zk = 0; E)
= P (Yk = yj, Yj = yk | Zj = 1, Zk = 0; E).
However, because the two individuals have the opposite treatment assignment,
this would only be true under the null of no treatment effect. While we could
consider the causal exchangebility statements under the null, the structural
model allows us to make explicit the hypothetical switching of the treatments
without this restriction. Thus, we will proceed with this notational device. We
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Fig 2. The postulated data generating mechanism under the randomized setting E. The dashed
arrow Zi −→ Yi is not present under the null hypothesis of no treatment effect.
also note that a statement such as (2.2) can be extended to any finite sequence of
observations (and consequently to infinite sequences), conditional on a sequence
of treatment assignments, as
P (f(z1, X1, U1) = y1, . . . , f(zn, Xn, Un) = yn | Z1 = z1, . . . , Zn = zn; E)
= P (f(z1, Xρ(1), Uρ(1)) = y1, . . . , f(zn, Xρ(n), Uρ(n)) = yn | Z1 = z1, . . . , Zn = zn; E),
for any permutation ρ(.) of the indices.
2.3. Restoring exchangeability through conditioning.
In the present example, comparability of the groups under the observational
setting O can be achieved by stratifying on the baseline CD4 count. Let now
Ax and Bx denote groups selected so that (Zi = 1, Xi = x) ∀ i ∈ Ax and
(Zi = 0, Xi = x) ∀ i ∈ Bx. Consequently, for further individuals j and k with
opposite treatment assignments by matched with their baseline CD4 count we
would have
P (Yj = yj , Yk = yk | Xj = Xk = x, Zj = 1, Zk = 0;O) (2.3)
≡ P (f(1, x, Uj) = yj, f(0, x, Uk) = yk | Xj = Xk = x, Zj = 1, Zk = 0;O)
= P (f(0, x, Uj) = yk, f(1, x, Uk) = yj | Xj = Xk = x, Zj = 1, Zk = 0;O).
This implies that f(z,Xj, Uj) | (Xj = Xk = x, Zj = 1, Zk = 0)
d
= f(z,Xk, Uk) |
(Xj = Xk = x, Zj = 1, Zk = 0) under O, and further that Zi ⊥ f(z, x, Ui) |
Xi = x under O. Because the same applies also under the experimental setting
E , we also have that P (Yi | Xi = x, Zi = z; E) = P (f(z, x, Ui) | Xi = x, Zi =
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z; E) = P (f(z, x, Ui) | Xi = x; E) = P (f(z, x, Ui) | Xi = x;O) = P (f(z, x, Ui) |
Xi = x, Zi = z;O) = P (Yi | Xi = x, Zi = z;O). The last equivalence P (Yi |
Xi, Zi; E) = P (Yi | Xi, Zi;O) is the ‘no confounding’ condition termed stability
by Dawid and Didelez (2010). Here exchangeability implied stability, but the
generally the reverse is not true; in Section 4 we consider a longitudinal setting
where stability holds and exchangeability does not.
2.4. Connection to posterior predictive inferences
The comparison (2.3) involved two individuals with an opposite treatment as-
signment, and is the relevant one for causal considerations. For predictive con-
siderations, we might also be interested in comparing a further individual j as
defined in the previous section to the observed individuals i ∈ Ax as well as
individual k to i ∈ Bx. The corresponding exchangeability statement
P (Yi = yi, Yj = yj | Xi = Xj = x, Zi = Zj = 1;O) (2.4)
= P (Yi = yj , Yj = yi | Xi = Xj = x, Zi = Zj = 1;O)
applies for all i ∈ Ax, with a symmetric statement applying to k and i ∈ Bx.
This corresponds to the usual kind of partial exchangeability within subgroups
with the same characteristics (Bernardo and Smith, 1994, p. 169). The pairwise
echangeability statement (2.4) can be extended to the symmetry of the outcomes
for all {j}∪Ax and {j}∪Ax. Using the shorthand notation DC ≡ {(Xi, Zi, Yi) :
i ∈ C} for all variables observed on individuals in the set C, and with nAx ≡ |Ax|
and nAx ≡ |Bx| large enough, it would then be natural to estimate the treatment
effect by
∑
x
{
E[Yj | Xj = x, Zj = 1, DAx ;O]
− E[Yk | Xk = x, Zk = 0, DBx ;O]
} nAx + nBx∑
x(nAx + nBx)
≈
∑
x
{y¯Ax − y¯Bx}
nAx + nBx∑
x(nAx + nBx)
, (2.5)
where the last form follows by approximating the within-stratum posterior pre-
dictive means by the sample means (cf. Lindley and Novick, 1981, p. 47). Thus,
the above motivates the classical direct standardization formula for the marginal
treatment effect, and makes clear the connection to posterior predictive infer-
ences.
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If the strata are too small for the use of direct standardization, however,
in Bayesian inference one would instead have to pool the observed data and
connect them to the predictions through parametric probability models. We
will formalize this in the following section, but note here that the modeling
approach requires the existence of a parameter vectors Φ and Ψ given which
Yi ⊥ DC | (Xi, Zi, φ) and Xi ⊥ XC | ψ under O, for all i /∈ C. The existence
of such parameters is implied by the exchangeability of infinite sequences of
random vectors (Xi, Yi, Zi) over the unit indices i (see Section 3.1), which applies
always if the unit indices contain no relevant information (Gelman et al., 2004,
p. 6). Consideration of statements such as (2.3) is then indicative of whether
such parameters have a causal interpretation, while the partial exchangeability
consideration such as (2.4) indicates whether they can be used for prediction.
A parametric counterpart to (2.5) can be given as∫
φ,ψ
∑
x
{
E[Yj | Xj = x, Zj = 1, φ;O]− E[Yk | Xk = x, Zk = 0, φ;O]
}
(2.6)
× P (Xj = x | ψ;O)P (dφ, dψ | dC ;O),
which we will motivate more formally in the following section. It is apparent
from (2.6) that drawing causal inferences is possible if the pairwise comparisons
such as
E[Yj | Xj = x, Zj = 1, φ;O]− E[Yk | Xk = x, Zk = 0, φ;O]
are unconfounded, with φ parametrizing the causal effect of Zi on Yi when
controlling for Xi.
2.5. Connection to other latent variable formulations.
Under the point treatment setting, criterion (2.3) is equivalent to other condi-
tions for unconfounded inferences stated in terms of conceptual latent variables
representing general confounding. For instance, Definition 1 of Arjas (2012)
connects unconfounded inferences to the conditional independence property
Zi ⊥ Ui | Xi. As noted in Section 2.3, the symmetry property (2.3) implies
that Zi ⊥ f(z, x, Ui) | Xi = x ⇔ Zi ⊥ Ui | Xi = x under O. Because of the
latter, the converse is also true, since the labels of the units j and k do not
involve hidden information about the (latent determinants of the) outcomes.
Although formulations in terms of latent variables need not rely on causal
graphs, the absence of unmeasured confounders can be stated equivalently in
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terms of the d-separation criterion of Pearl (2009, p. 87). The above conditional
independence implies the absence of the arrow Ui −→ Zi, and in a modified (un-
der the null) subgraph of Figure 1, where the arrow Zi −→ Yi has been removed,
we have d-separation of Yi and Zi given Xi, which implies that Xi is a sufficient
set of variables to control for confounding. Conversely, supposing that our prior
information O is encoded in Figure 1, said d-separation implies exchangeability,
following the reasoning in Section 2.3, where given the treatment assignment
and the measured pre-treatment covariates, the labels are uninformative of the
outcomes.
2.6. Connection to the potential outcomes notation
Under the structural definition of the outcome, we can take the potential out-
comes of individual i to be determined by Yiz = f(z,Xi, Ui) (cf. Pearl, 2009, p.
98), with the observed outcome given by Yi = YiZi (the latter known as the con-
sistency assumption (e.g. Cole and Frangakis, 2009; VanderWeele, 2009a; Pearl,
2010). As discussed in the previous two sections, the symmetry property (2.3)
implies that Zi ⊥ f(z, x, Ui) | Xi = x ⇔ Zi ⊥ Yiz | Xi = x under O. The
converse is also true, similarly to the latent variable formulation in the previous
section. The condition
Yiz ⊥ Zi | Xi (2.7)
is in fact the probabilistic ‘conditional exchangeability’ condition as defined by
Herna´n and Robins (2006, p. 579), or the first part of the strongly ignorable
treatment assignment condition, as defined by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, p.
43). Although Rubin (1978, p. 41) uses exchangeability in the usual Bayesian
sense to justify an IID model construction, as far as we know, the connection be-
tween the Bayesian notion of exchangeability and the condition stated in terms
of potential outcomes has not been made or studied within the framework of
Rubin’s causal model (as termed by Holland, 1986). In contrast, this connec-
tion is implied in Greenland and Robins (1986), Greenland, Robins and Pearl
(1999) and Greenland and Robins (2009).
We note that, under the probabilistic exchangeability condition (2.3), the
remaining determinants of the outcome have the same population distribution
between the treatment groups. Requiring that these determinants also have the
same empirical distribution between the groups Ax and Bx would correspond to
the deterministic exchangeability condition laid out by Greenland and Robins
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(1986, p. 415). This is unnecessarily strong for unconfounded inferences; it rules
out both confounding and imbalance (e.g. the chance imbalances that could
arise even under complete randomization). If we could condition on all the de-
terminants of the outcome, the symmetry property could be written as
P (Yj = yj, Yk = yk | Xj = Xk = x, Uj = Uk = u, Zj = 1, Zk = 0;O)
≡ P (f(1, Xj , Uj) = yj , f(0, Xk, Uk) = yk | Xj = Xk = x, Uj = Uk = u, Zj = 1, Zk = 0;O)
= P (f(0, Xj , Uj) = yk, f(1, Xk, Uk) = yj | Xj = Xk = x, Uj = Uk = u, Zj = 1, Zk = 0;O)
=
{
1, when (yj , yk) = (f(1, x, u), f(0, x, u))
0, when (yj , yk) 6= (f(1, x, u), f(0, x, u)).
Thus, with this conditioning, the outcome is a deterministic function of the
treatment assignment, and exchangeability applies trivially. This would be re-
quired for identifying individual level causal effects, which is impossible in prac-
tice (the ‘fundamental problem of causal inference’ as discussed by Holland,
1986). The probabilistic condition is sufficient for identifying population level
effects.
We note that in the point treatment setting, and assuming an underlying
model applying under all causal formulations, such as the structural definition,
exchangeability is equivalent to alternative ‘no confounding’ assumptions. In
the following section we connect the concept of (conditional) exchangeability to
Bayesian causal inference.
3. Definition and estimation of causal contrasts
3.1. Causal contrasts as posterior predictive expectations
As noted by Greenland (2012), causal inference can alternatively be formulated
as a prediction problem or a missing data problem; the potential outcomes
notation corresponds to the latter formulation. In the Bayesian framework, a
causal contrast of interest may be naturally defined in terms of posterior pre-
dictive expectations for further exchangeable individuals under the hypothetical
experimental setting already introduced above. Denoting a finite sequence of ob-
servations as dC ≡ {(xi, yi, zi) : i ∈ C}, we define the causal contrast of interest
under the randomized setting as the limit of the posterior predictive difference
lim
n→∞
E[Yj | Zj = zj , dC ; E ]− lim
n→∞
E[Yk | Zk = zk, dC ; E ], (3.1)
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where n ≡ |C| and j, k /∈ C. We may consider such a contrast for arbitrary
settings of the treatment indicators zj and zk, thus mimicking the classical
‘intervention’ formulation of the causal contrast. Note, however, that no special
mathematical definitions or tools, other than those associated with fundamental
exchangeability concepts, are required in this definition.
By de Finetti’s representation theorem, the joint distribution of the data may
be written
P (DC ; E) =
∫
θ
∏
i∈C
P (Di | θ; E)P (dθ; E)
=
∫
φ,ψ
∏
i∈C
[P (Yi | xi, zi, φ; E)P (Xi | ψ; E)]P (dφ, dψ; E)
×
∫
γ
∏
i∈C
P (Zi | γ; E)P (dγ; E), (3.2)
where θ = (φ, γ, ψ) represents a partition of the joint parameter vector corre-
sponding to the above factorization of the joint parameter-conditional distribu-
tion of Di ≡ (Xi, Yi, Zi) in the second line, provided parameter Γ is assumed
a priori independent of the parameters (Φ,Ψ) (cf. Gelman et al., 2004, p. 354–
355). Now for any i /∈ C the expectations in (3.1) may be written as
E[Yi | zi, dC ; E ] =
∫
yi,xi
yiP (dyi, dxi | zi, dC ; E)
=
∫
yi,xi
yi
∫
φ,ψ
∏
j∈i∪C [P (dyj | xj , zj, φ; E)P (dxj | ψ; E)]P (dφ, dψ; E)∫
yi,xi
∫
φ,ψ
∏
j∈i∪C [P (dyj | xj , zj , φ; E)P (dxj | ψ; E)]P (dφ, dψ; E)
=
∫
yi,xi
yi
∫
φ,ψ
P (dyi | xi, zi, φ; E)P (dxi | ψ; E)P (dφ, dψ | dC ; E). (3.3)
Here the terms involving parameters Γ cancel out because Zi ⊥ Xi under E
(and Γ ⊥ (Φ,Ψ)); note that this would not hold under the observational setting
O.
If we further assume regularity conditions that allow interchanging the order
of limit and integration, the limit of the above expectation becomes
lim
n→∞
E[Yi | zi, dC ; E ] =
∫
xi
∫
φ,ψ
E[Yi | xi, zi, φ; E ]P (dxi | ψ; E)δφ0(φ)δψ0 (ψ) dφdψ
=
∫
xi
E[Yi | xi, zi, φ0; E ]P (dxi | ψ0; E), (3.4)
assuming that the posterior distribution converges to a degenerate distribution
at the true parameter values (φ0, ψ0) (cf. van der Vaart, 1998, p. 139). Since,
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following Bernardo and Smith (1994, p. 173), we interpret parameters as (un-
known) functions of infinite sequences of observables, the form (3.4) motivates
definition (3.1) as the causal parameter of interest, as (3.4) does not depend on
the prior P (dφ, dψ; E).
3.2. Estimation under the observational setting
We now outline the Bayesian predictive view of the standard conditions under
which causal inference is typically carried out in the observational setting.
Identification: In order to estimate the causal contrast (3.1) defined under the
experimental setting E based on data collected under the observational setting
O, in (3.3) we have to make the substitutions P (Yi | xi, zi, φ; E) = P (Yi |
xi, zi, φ;O) and P (Xi | ψ; E) = P (Xi | ψ;O); the former corresponds to the
stability assumption, which in turn is implied by the conditional exchangeability
property (2.3). The latter can be taken to be true by definition, i.e. the standard
population is chosen according to the observed covariate distribution. Under
these assumptions, the parameters φ and ψ have the same interpretation under
both settings E and O. This gives an estimator for (3.4) as∫
xi
∫
φ,ψ
E[Yi | xi, zi, φ;O]P (dxi | ψ;O)P (dφ, dψ | dC ;O). (3.5)
We may also wish to state an identifiability condition in frequency-based
terms. Since (3.5) is taken to be the estimator of the parameter (3.4), it is
natural to require consistency, which we have if limn→∞ P (dφ, dψ | dC ;O) =
δφ0(φ)δψ0 (ψ). In other words, the inferences will be unconfounded if∫
xi
E[Yi | xi, zi, φ0;O]P (dxi | ψ0;O) = lim
n→∞
E[Yi | zi, dC ; E ].
In Section 4.1 we will give an example where a similar condition can hold without
conditional exchangeability corresponding to the model components; in such
case the model parameters will not have a causal interpretation, so it is natural
to link the causal exchangeability condition to parametric inferences.
A causal contrast could be defined alternatively in terms of potential outcome
variables as E[Y1i]−E[Y0i]. For unconfounded inferences we could then require
that ∫
xi
E[Yi | xi, Zi = z;O]P (dxi | O) = E[Yzi], (3.6)
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which follows from (2.7) (e.g. Herna´n and Robins, 2006, p. 579), and makes no
explicit reference to the parametrization of the problem.
Positivity: To ensure that the conditional distributions above are well defined,
we need an additional assumption known as positivity, that is, absolute conti-
nuity of the two measures under E and O (cf. Dawid and Didelez, 2010, p. 196),
stated as P (Zi | xi, γ; E) ≪ P (Zi | xi, γ;O), which is equivalent to
P (Zi | xi, γ;O) = 0 ⇒ P (Zi | xi, γ; E) = 0 (3.7)
⇔ P (Zi | xi, γ; E) 6= 0 ⇒ P (Zi | xi, γ;O) 6= 0.
In particular, if the treatment Zi depends deterministically on the covariates
Xi, inference across the observational and experimental settings would not be
possible.
Estimation of posterior predictive expectations (3.3) may be carried out using
Monte Carlo integration by sampling from the posterior distribution of (Φ,Ψ).
Since the distributions P (Yi | xi, zi, φ;O) and P (Xi | ψ;O) implied by the rep-
resentation theorem are unknown, in practice these have to be replaced with sta-
tistical models. These do not necessarily have to be parametric (that is, having
finite dimensional Φ and Ψ, cf. Bernardo and Smith, 1994, p. 228), for instance,
we would usually like to model P (Xi | ψ;O) with the empirical distribution
of Xi; however, in practice the curse of dimensionality limits the use of non-
parametric specifications, and dimension-reducing modeling assumptions will
become a necessity. When finite dimensional parametrizations are used, model
misspecification becomes a potential issue. In particular, one may lose the im-
portant property of valid inferences under the null hypothesis of no treatment
effect, as will be elaborated in the following section.
4. Longitudinal setting and the null paradox
Having established the Bayesian formulation of causal inference in point treat-
ment settings, we now seek to extend this reasoning to the longitudinal case,
where confounding structures may be more complex. For simplicity we consider
the two time-point case, and contend that the extension to multiple time-points
follows straightforwardly. We address in particular the pitfalls of adopting incor-
rect modelling assumptions when drawing inferences about causal parameters of
interest, and study a well-known example of flawed inference, the null paradox.
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Fig 3. The postulated data generating mechanism under the observational longitudinal setting
O. The dashed arrows are not present under the null hypothesis of no treatment effect when Xi
is a time-dependent confounder. Note that the null hypothesis also holds under an alternative
DAG, where the arrow Z1i −→ Xi is omitted, and the dotted arrow Xi −→ Yi is present
.
4.1. Exchangeability and sequential randomization
Consider now the slightly more complicated setting in the DAG of Figure 3,
adapted from Robins and Wasserman (1997), where the design variables Z1i
and Z2i represent the treatment assignment to receive a particular dose of AZT
medication starting from baseline and from a subsequent re-examination, re-
spectively, for individual i. Further, let Xi represent observed anemia status at
the re-examination, and Yi an HIV viral load outcome, measured at the end
of follow-up after sufficient time has passed from the re-examination. Latent
variable Ui again represents the underlying immune function of individual i,
which is expected to be a determinant of both Xi and Yi. Here Xi has the
role of a time-dependent confounder (Robins, Herna´n and Brumback, 2000, p.
550), which makes the judgement of exchangeability somewhat more involved.
For the causal exchangeability considerations, we take the intermediate variable
and outcome to be determined by the structural models Xi = g(Z1i, Ui) and
Yi = f(Z1i, Z2i, Xi, Ui).
The principal source of difficulty is represented by the latent variable Ui.
To consider its implications for inference, we first define the causal contrast
of interest in terms of a completely randomized counterpart of the setting in
Figure 3, depicted in Figure 4. Letting dC = {(xi, yi, z1i, z2i) : i ∈ C} represent
a sequence of n = |C| observations, we may now define the causal contrast of
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Fig 4. The postulated data generating mechanism under the completely randomized longitu-
dinal setting E. The dashed arrows are not present under the null hypothesis of no treatment
effect when Xi is a time-dependent confounder.
interest as
lim
n→∞
E[Yj | Z1j = z1j , Z2j = z2j , dC ; E ]− lim
n→∞
E[Yk | Z1k = z1k, Z2k = z2k, dC ; E ],
where j, k /∈ C. The expectations here can be represented alternatively as
lim
n→∞
E[Yi | z1i, z2i, dC ; E ] = E[Yi | z1i, z2i, ϕ0; E ] (4.1)
or
lim
n→∞
E[Yi | z1i, z2i, dC ; E ] =
∫
xi
E[Yi | xi, z1i, z2i, φ
∗
0; E ]P (dxi | z1i, ψ
∗
0 ; E) (4.2)
or finally
lim
n→∞
E[Yi | z1i, z2i, dC ; E ] (4.3)
=
∫
xi,ui
E[Yi | xi, z1i, z2i, ui, φ
†
0; E ]P (dxi | z1i, ui, ψ
†
0; E)P (dui | η
†
0; E).
Note the different parameters ϕ, (φ∗, ψ∗) and (φ†, ψ†, η†) in the three represen-
tations. The full joint representation in (4.3) corresponds to the data gener-
ating mechanism, whose parameters are determined by the representation for
infinitely exchangeable random vectors (Xi, Yi, Z1i, Z2i, Ui), whereas the param-
eters that appear in (4.1) and (4.2) are consequences of this joint model obtained
by marginalization.
Similarly to Section 2.2, and for simplicity taking the treatment assignments
to be binary, we can consider the comparability of groups selected to have a
given treatment assignment configuration. The exchangeability with respect to
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the intermediate variable Xi can be established as before. For the outcome Yi,
we consider exchangeability separately at the time of each treatment. We intro-
duce the notations A1 = {i : Z1i = 1, Z2i = 1}, A2 = {i : Z1i = 1, Z2i = 0},
A3 = {i : Z1i = 0, Z2i = 1}, and A4 = {i : Z1i = 0, Z2i = 0} for the
groups being compared. We note that the parameters ϕ in the outcome model
P (Yi | z1i, z2i, ϕ; E) corresponding to parametrization (4.1) would not be es-
timable under the observational setting O; this is because, for instance, at the
second time point, the outcomes of individuals j and k with opposite treatment
assignments would not be exchangeable (those assigned to treatment at the sec-
ond interval are likely to have better underlying immune function status than
those not assigned to treatment, with the second assignment depending on Xi),
that is,
P (Yj = yj, Yk = yk | · ;O)
≡ P (f(1, 1, g(1, Uj), Uj) = yj , f(1, 0, g(1, Uk), Uk) = yk | · ;O)
= P (f(1, 1, Xj, Uj) = yj , f(1, 0, Xk, Uk) = yk | · ;O)
6= P (f(1, 0, Xj, Uj) = yk, f(1, 1, Xk, Uk) = yj | · ;O),
where · = {Z1j = Z1k = 1, Z2j = 1, Z2k = 0}.
Instead, adopting parametrization (4.2) and modeling of the conditional dis-
tributions P (Yi | xi, z1i, z2i, φ
∗;O) and P (Xi | z1i, ψ
∗; E) seems a way to pro-
ceed, since based on Figure 3 we have that Z1i ⊥ Ui and Z2i ⊥ Ui | (Z1i, Xi)
under O which together imply the sequential randomization condition discussed
by e.g. Dawid and Didelez (2010, p. 200), or stability P (Yi | Xi, Z1i, Z2i; E) =
P (Yi | Xi, Z1i, Z2i;O) and P (dxi | Z1i; E) = P (dxi | Z1i;O). Stability would be
sufficient to ensure non-parametric identification of the marginal causal contrast
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because
P (Yi | z1i, z2i; E) =
∫
xi,ui
P (Yi, dxi, dui, Z1i = z1i, Z2i = z2i; E)
P (Z1i = z1i, Z2i = z2i; E)
=
∫
xi,ui
P (Yi | xi, ui, z1i, z2i; E)P (dxi | ui, z1i; E)P (dui | z1i; E)
=
∫
xi,ui
P (Yi | xi, ui, z1i, z2i; E)P (dui | xi, z1i, z2i; E)P (dxi | z1i; E)
=
∫
xi
[∫
ui
P (Yi, dui | xi, z1i, z2i; E)
]
P (dxi | z1i; E)
=
∫
xi
P (Yi | xi, z1i, z2i; E)P (dxi | z1i; E)
=
∫
xi
P (Yi | xi, z1i, z2i;O)P (dxi | z1i;O).
However, under the longitudinal setting introducing stratification by Xi does
not restore the conditional exchangeability of all the groups being compared.
We denote the groups being compared by A1x = {i : Xi = x, Z1i = 1, Z2i = 1},
A2x = {i : Xi = x, Z1i = 1, Z2i = 0}, A3x = {i : Xi = x, Z1i = 0, Z2i = 1}, and
A4x = {i : Xi = x, Z1i = 0, Z2i = 0}. We now have exchangeability between
individuals j and k with opposing treatment assignments at the second time
point, that is,
P (Yj = yj, Yk = yk | · ;O)
≡ P (f(1, 1, x, Uj) = yj , f(1, 0, x, Uk) = yk | · ;O)
= P (f(1, 0, x, Uj) = yk, f(1, 1, x, Uk) = yj | · ;O).
where · = {Xj = Xk = x, Z1j = Z1k = 1, Z2j = 1, Z2k = 0}. However, when
comparing individuals with opposite treatment assignments at the first time
point, the conditional exchangeability condition
P (Yj = yj, Yk = yk | · ;O) (4.4)
≡ P (f(1, 0, x, Uj) = yj , f(0, 0, x, Uk) = yk | · ;O)
= P (f(0, 0, x, Uj) = yk, f(1, 0, x, Uk) = yj | · ;O),
where · = {Xj = Xk = x, Z1j = 1, Z1k = 0, Z2j = Z2k = 0}, does not
hold. For (4.4) to hold, the distributions of Uj and Uk would have to be the
same, but instead the prior information we have on the relationships between
the variables indicates for example that those without anemia and assigned to
treatment at the first interval are likely to have better immune function status
O. Saarela et al./Exchangeability in causal inference 21
than those without anemia and no treatment at the first interval, since initi-
ation of the treatment is in itself a cause of anemia. This would be the case
also if the groups being compared had been formed under the completely ran-
domized setting E , even though then the groups would be exchangeable with-
out the stratification. In the causal inference literature this phenomenon has
been called collider stratification bias (e.g. Greenland, 2003), Berkson’s bias or
merely selection bias ; as demonstrated, it can equally well be understood as lack
of conditional exchangeability of the groups being compared in terms of their
pre-treatment characteristics. Exchangeability does hold matching on the initial
treatment assignment Zi1, but this would not allow estimation of the effect of
Zi1. The non-exchangeability of the groups not matched with respect to the
initial treatment assignment is illustrated in the simulation study presented in
the Appendix.
The lack of conditional exchangeability corresponding to (4.4) implies that
the parameters φ∗ specifying the conditional probability model P (Yi | xi, z1i, z2i, φ
∗;O)
would not have a causal interpretation and thus a modeling strategy based on
finite-dimensional parametrization (φ∗, ψ∗) might not be successful. In particu-
lar, without an appropriate parametrization of the problem, we may lose the im-
portant property of valid inferences under the null hypothesis of no treatment ef-
fect, which gives rise to the so-called null paradox (e.g. Robins and Wasserman,
1997, p. 411-412, Vansteelandt, Bekaert and Claeskens, 2010, p. 11; Dawid and Didelez,
2010, p. 224). We note that while sequential randomization is sufficient for non-
parametric identification, it does not imply conditional exchangeability of the
type (4.4). Instead, the conditional exchangeability condition (4.4) relates to
the stronger conditional independence condition (Z1i, Z2i) ⊥ Ui | Xi required
for identification of controlled direct effects (e.g. Robins and Greenland, 1992;
VanderWeele, 2009b). This does not hold under the setting of Figure 3, but ex-
changeability could be restored by introducing further conditioning on Ui, which
implies that (4.3) would be the correct causal parametrization. However, since
Ui is unobserved, use of such parametrization in practice would introduce new
identifiability problems. Alternative inference methods exist which indeed can
identify the causal contrast under the sequential randomization condition, and
with fewer parametric modeling assumptions; consider, for example marginal
structural models estimated using inverse probability of treatment weighting
(Robins, Herna´n and Brumback, 2000; Herna´n, Brumback and Robins, 2001).
Nonetheless, the judgement of exchangeability does warn us of a situation where
null paradox type model mis-specification is likely to arise.
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4.2. Valid inferences under an incorrect model
Equations (4.2) and (4.3) do give a condition under which a parametrization
which overlooks the latent variables Ui still results in valid inferences. This is
the case when, for a given (φ†, φ†, η†), there exists (φ∗, ψ∗) so that∫
xi,ui
E[Yi | xi, z1i, z2i, ui, φ
†; E ]P (dxi | z1i, ui, ψ
†; E)P (dui | η
†; E) (4.5)
=
∫
xi
E[Yi | xi, z1i, z2i, φ
∗; E ]P (dxi | z1i, ψ
∗; E)
for all (z1i, z2i). Note that under the null hypothesis of no treatment effect,
correct type I error rate is achieved.
As an example, consider a case where the correct parametrization is given by
Yi ∼ N(φ
†
1 + φ
†
2z1i + φ
†
3z2i + φ
†
4xi + φ
†
5ui, φ
†
6),
Xi | (z1i, ui, ψ
†) ∼ Bernoulli(expit{ψ†1 + ψ
†
2z1i + ψ
†
3ui}) and
Ui ∼ N(0, η
†),
and the parametrization without the latent variable is specified as
Yi ∼ N(φ
∗
1 + φ
∗
2z
∗
1i + φ
∗
3z2i + φ
∗
4xi, φ
∗
5) and
Xi | (z1i, ψ
∗) ∼ Bernoulli(expit{ψ∗1 + ψ
∗
2z1i}).
With the correct parametrization, the conditional expectation is given by∫
xi,ui
E[Yi | xi, z1i, z2i, ui, φ
†]P (dxi | z1i, ui, ψ
†)P (dui | η
†)
= φ†1 + φ
†
2z1i + φ
†
3z2i + φ
†
5E[Ui] + φ
†
4
∫
ui
P (Xi = 1 | z1i, ui, ψ
†)P (dui | η
†).
Similarly, with the parametrization (φ∗, ψ∗), the conditional expectation be-
comes∫
xi
E[Yi | xi, z1i, z2i, φ
∗]P (dxi | z1i, ψ
∗) = φ∗1+φ
∗
2z1i+φ
∗
3z2i+φ
∗
4P (Xi = 1 | z1i, ψ
∗).
Consider first the situation where φ†4 6= 0, in which case the null hypothesis
corresponds to φ†2 = φ
†
3 = ψ
†
2 = 0. In this case (4.5) holds true for all (z1i, z2i) if
φ∗2 = φ
∗
3 = ψ
∗
2 = 0
φ∗1 + φ
∗
4expit{ψ
∗
1} = φ
†
1 + φ
†
4
∫
ui
expit{ψ†1 + ψ
†
3ui}P (dui | η
†).
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In this setting Xi is not a time-dependent confounder (in Figure 3, we do not
have the arrow from Z1i to Xi), and the setting essentially reduces to the point
treatment setting (with more treatment levels) of Section 3, in which case the
condition (4.4) does indeed hold true. In the case of φ†4 = 0, the null hypothesis
is φ†2 = φ
†
3 = 0. Now, if in addition ψ
†
2 6= 0, the estimators of parameters φ
∗
2 and
φ∗4 will not converge to zero because of the confounding due to the latent factor
Ui. However, in the special case of z1i, z2i ∈ {0, 1}, it is easy to see that (4.5)
holds true under the null hypothesis for all (z1i, z2i) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}
if
φ∗1 = φ
†
1
φ∗3 = 0
φ∗2 + φ
∗
4 (expit{ψ
∗
1 + ψ
∗
2} − expit{ψ
∗
1}) = 0.
This only applies when the treatment assignments are binary, which can be seen
for example by comparing the conditional expectations with (z1j , z2j) = (1, 2)
and (z1k, z2k) = (2, 1). This is a manifestation of the null paradox.
4.3. Null-robust parametrizations
To circumvent the null paradox, Robins and Wasserman (1997, p. 415-416) sug-
gest deterministic 1-1 transformation of the observed variables (Xi, Yi, Z1i, Z2i)
into (Xi, Ui, Z1i, Z2i), so that Yi is σ(Xi, Ui, Z1i, Z2i)-measurable, Z2i ⊥ Ui |
(Xi, Z1i) and Z1i ⊥ Ui. Here the variable Ui assumes the role of a baseline co-
variate which determines the causal type of each individual i givenXi. Following
the reasoning in Sections 2.6 and 4.1, we can motivate such a transformation in
terms of restoring the conditional exchangeability through further conditioning
on the pre-treatment characteristics Ui.
In order to construct a transformation possessing the above outlined proper-
ties, a deterministic model for the treatment effect is specified, which may take
a parametric form such as (cf. Robins and Wasserman, 1997, p. 415)
Yi = r(Ui, Xi, Z1i, Z2i, λ) (4.6)
≡ Ui + λ1Z1i + λ2Z2i + λ3Z1iZ2i + λ4Z2iXi.
The limiting posterior predictive expectations giving the causal contrast of in-
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terest can now be parameterized as
lim
n→∞
E[Yi | z1i, z2i, dC ; E ]
= lim
n→∞
E [r(Ui, Xi, z1i, z2i, λ) | z1i, z2i, dC ; E ]
=
∫
ui,xi
r(ui, xi, z1i, z2i, λ)P (dxi | z1i, ui, ψ0; E)P (dui | τ0; E)
∂ui
∂yi
.
(4.7)
It is now apparent that such a parametrization is null-robust, since the null
hypothesis corresponds to λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0, in which case Ui = Yi, and
further,
E [r(Ui, Xi, z1i, z2i, λ) | z1i, z2i, dC ; E ] = E [Yi | yC ; E ] .
In the above reasoning the transformation parameters λ were fixed; in practice
these have to be estimated. For this purpose, the joint distribution for the
observed data can be written as
P (DC ;O) =
∫
λ
P (XC , YC , Z1C , Z2C | λ;O)P (dλ;O)
=
∫
λ
P (XC , UC(λ), Z1C , Z2C | λ;O)
∣∣∣∣∂UC(λ)∂YC
∣∣∣∣P (dλ;O)
=
∫
λ,θ
n∏
i=1
[
P (Xi, Ui(λ), Z1i, Z2i | λ, θ;O)
∂Ui(λ)
∂Yi
]
P (dλ, dθ;O)
=
∫
λ,γ1,γ1,ψ,τ
n∏
i=1
[
P (Z2i | xi, z1i, γ2;O)P (Xi | z1i, ui(λ), λ, ψ;O)
× P (Z1i | γ1;O)P (Ui(λ) | λ, τ ;O)
∂Ui(λ)
∂Yi
]
× P (dλ, dγ1, dγ2, dψ, dτ ;O),
where θ ≡ (γ1, γ2, ψ, τ). As outlined in Section 3, quantities (4.7) would then be
estimated by∫
ui,xi
∫
λ,ψ,τ
r(ui(λ), xi, z1i, z2i, λ)P (dxi | z1i, ui(λ), λ, ψ;O) (4.8)
× P (dui(λ) | λ, τ ;O)
∂ui(λ)
∂yi
P (dλ, dψ, dτ | dC ;O),
where (cf. Robins and Wasserman, 1997, p. 416)
P (dλ, dψ, dτ | dC ;O)
λ,ψ,τ
∝
n∏
i=1
[
P (dxi | z1i, ui(λ), λ, ψ;O)P (dui(λ) | λ, τ ;O)
∂ui(λ)
∂yi
]
P (dλ, dψ, dτ ;O).
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4.4. Simulation study
To numerically demonstrate the effects of null paradox type model mis-specification
in finite samples, we replicated drawing n = 1000 independent observations from
the conditional distributions
Yi | (xi, z1i, z2i, ui) ∼ N(φ02z1i + φ03z2i + φ04xi + ui, 1),
Z2i | (xi, z1i, ui) ∼ Poisson(0.2z1i + 1.5xi),
Xi | (z1i, ui) ∼ Bernoulli(expit{−3.0 + 1.5z1i + 2ui}),
Z1i | ui ∼ Poisson(1), and
Ui ∼ N(0, 1),
corresponding to Figure 3. The Poisson distributions were chosen to draw the
‘doses’, since as demonstrated in Section 4.1, the mis-specification manifests it-
self only when there are more than two treatment levels. We considered two dif-
ferent scenarios, (φ02, φ03, φ04) = (0, 0, 0) and (φ02, φ03, φ04) = (0.15, 0.15, 1.5),
the former corresponding to the null hypothesis of no treatment effect. The
parameters of interest are the marginal causal contrasts of the form
µ(z1i,z2i) ≡ lim
n→∞
E[Yi | Z1i = z1i, Z2i = z2i, dC ; E ]
− lim
n→∞
E[Yj | Z1j = 0, Z2j = 0, dC ; E ],
which we attempt to estimate using the parametrization (4.2), where, as be-
fore, we substitute in the parametric models Yi ∼ N(φ
∗
1 + φ
∗
2z
∗
1i + φ
∗
3z2i +
φ∗4xi, φ
∗
5) and Xi | (z1i, ψ
∗) ∼ Bernoulli(expit{ψ∗1 + ψ
∗
2z1i}). We also fitted
the outcome model with two- and three-way interactions to see whether this
is any help in reducing the effects of mis-specification. For comparison, we
also calculated the expected outcomes from naive (unadjusted for xi) and ad-
justed outcome models, as well as from a (parametric) marginal structural
model, fitted as inverse probability of treatment weighted linear regression,
where the weights were estimated by fitting the treatment assignment mod-
els Z1i ∼ Poisson(γ11), and Z2i | (xi, z1i) ∼ Poisson(γ21 + γ22z1i + γ23xi). In
addition, we applied the null-robust parametrization (4.7), where the trans-
formation function parameterized w.r.t. λ was specified as in (4.6). For the
marginal distribution of the transformed variable Ui we tried two alternative
specifications, Ui(λ) | τ ∼ N(τ1, τ
2
2 ) and Ui(λ) | τ ∼ NPQM(τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4), the
latter being the four-parameter normal-polynomial quantile mixture (NPQM)
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distribution proposed by Karvanen (2006) and applied in a regression model-
ing context by Saarela, Kulathinal and Karvanen (2012). The parameters of this
distribution are the first four L-moments, with the normal distribution obtained
as a special case when τ3 = 0 and τ4/τ2 = 0.1226. A logistic regression model
Xi | (z1i, ui(λ), λ, ψ) ∼ Bernoulli(expit{ψ1+ψ2z1i+ψ3ui(λ)}) was specified for
the variable Xi. Improper flat priors were used throughout. For evaluating the
posterior predictive expectations such as (4.8), we used Monte Carlo integra-
tion, drawing the parameters from the normal approximations θ ∼ N(θˆ, i−1(θˆ)),
where the θˆ are the maximum likelihood estimates for the collection of all model
parameters and i−1(θˆ) is the inverse of the Hessian matrix evaluated at θˆ.
Results for the various point estimators over 1000 replications are presented
in Table 1. Under the null setting, the results with the parametrization (4.2)
ignoring the latent variable indeed indicate spurious treatment effect in esti-
mation of the causal contrast µ(8,8). Adding interactions to the outcome model
does not alleviate the problem, as was noted by Robins and Wasserman (1997,
p. 412), nor did the addition of quadratic terms of the treatment variables into
the outcome model (results not shown). However, in estimation of the contrast
µ(8,8) the model is already used for extrapolation outside the range of the data,
since a treatment combination such as (z1i, z2i) = (8, 8) is very rare in the simu-
lated data, as Z1i ∼ Poisson(1). For this reason, no similar bias is visible in the
estimation of the causal contrasts µ(4,4) and µ(4,8). In contrast, the null-robust
parametrization (4.7) performs well in all three cases. Under the null hypothesis
the posterior predictive means and variances also resulted in correct frequentist
95% confidence interval coverage probabilities (results not shown).
These conclusions are less clear-cut under the under the non-null setting
(Table 1), where also the null-robust parametrization shows some bias. This is
not surprising since the null-robust parametrization is not ‘correct’ w.r.t. to the
true data generating mechanism, in the sense discussed by Amemiya and Powell
(1981) in the context of maximum likelihood estimation of the Box-Cox trans-
formation. Achieving both valid inferences under the null and good predictive
performance simultaneously is a challenge, so the intended use of the model
has to be a factor in the model choice. If the model is to be used for hypothe-
sis testing purposes, it is advisable to insist on valid inferences under the null.
It should be noted that also the parametric marginal structural model is sus-
ceptible to mis-specification, which is apparent especially under the alternative
setting; while the conditional outcome model used to generate the data is linear
in the exposures, the linearity does not necessarily hold true for the marginal
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Table 1
Results for various point estimators of marginal causal contrasts over 1000 replications
under the null setting (φ02, φ03, φ04) = (0, 0, 0) and under the non-null setting
(φ02, φ03, φ04) = (0.15, 0.15, 1.5). The results are mean, standard deviation and root mean
square error of the estimates.
Estimator Parameter
Null Non-null
Mean SD RMSE Mean Bias SD RMSE
(4.2) µ(4,4) -0.018 0.176 0.177 2.282 -0.029 0.198 0.201
µ(4,8) -0.028 0.182 0.185 2.872 -0.039 0.205 0.209
µ(8,8) -0.805 0.333 0.871 2.890 -0.815 0.335 0.881
(4.2) with µ(4,4) -0.099 0.276 0.293 2.201 -0.110 0.292 0.312
interactions µ(4,8) -0.056 0.233 0.240 2.844 -0.067 0.251 0.260
µ(8,8) -0.909 0.506 1.041 2.785 -0.919 0.508 1.050
Naive µ(4,4) -0.197 0.177 0.265 1.892 -0.419 0.206 0.467
µ(4,8) 0.449 0.182 0.484 3.910 0.999 0.213 1.022
µ(8,8) -0.394 0.354 0.530 3.784 0.080 0.411 0.419
Adjusted µ(4,4) -0.952 0.182 0.970 0.248 -2.064 0.182 2.072
µ(4,8) -0.963 0.230 0.990 0.837 -2.074 0.230 2.087
µ(8,8) -1.905 0.364 1.939 0.495 -3.209 0.364 3.230
MSM w. µ(4,4) 0.066 0.333 0.340 2.449 0.138 0.744 0.757
stabilized µ(4,8) 0.126 0.427 0.446 3.191 0.280 0.588 0.651
weights µ(8,8) 0.132 0.667 0.680 4.914 1.209 0.885 1.499
(4.7) µ(4,4) 0.002 0.195 0.195 2.147 -0.165 0.225 0.278
Normal µ(4,8) -0.008 0.215 0.215 2.846 -0.066 0.249 0.257
µ(8,8) -0.019 0.544 0.544 4.001 0.296 0.541 0.617
(4.7) µ(4,4) 0.000 0.194 0.194 2.095 -0.216 0.229 0.315
NPQM µ(4,8) -0.009 0.216 0.216 2.847 -0.064 0.255 0.263
µ(8,8) -0.019 0.547 0.547 4.192 0.488 0.559 0.742
outcome model (cf. Gelman, 2007, p. 157-158).
In summary, the null paradox is not difficult to reproduce in finite samples,
although in the present simulation setting bias manifested only when the para-
metric models were used for extrapolating beoynd the range of the data (which
is approaching violation of assumption (3.7)). The results given by parametriza-
tion (4.2) ignoring the latent variables can be improved by using the transformed
parametrization proposed by Robins and Wasserman (1997), which corresponds
to assuming a deterministic model such as (4.8) for the treatment effects. An
alternative would be to pursue a ‘correct’ model specification by parameterizing
in terms of latent variables in the postulated data generating mechanism, as in
(4.3), at the price of the potential identification problems that may result.
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5. Discussion
We have attempted to demonstrate that the Bayesian notion of exchange-
ability can indeed serve as a causal model, as was originally suggested by
Lindley and Novick (1981). That exchangeability can be formulated as an ig-
norability assumption, and that that marginal causal contrasts can be naturally
defined in terms of limits of posterior predictive expectations for further, yet
unobserved, exchangeable individuals, has not been appreciated in the causal
inference literature. We do not claim that the interpretation of exchangeability
as a causal model would have important practical advantages over alternative
causal models; the preference for a particular causal model as the notational sys-
tem is largely a matter of taste and convention. However, the proposed frame-
work links causality more closely to model parameters, and does enable more
natural incorporation of causal reasoning into the fully probabilistic Bayesian
framework, in the sense that no concepts external to de Finetti’s system are
necessary.
Under longitudinal settings where latent variables are present, null paradox
type model mis-specification is the central problem in parametric estimation
of marginal causal contrasts. Of course, the null paradox is not just related to
situations where a null hypothesis holds true, but rather implies model mis-
specification also in non-null settings. However, since mis-specification is al-
most ever-present in model-based inferences, it is reasonable to insist at least
on valid inferences under the null. We have attempted to demonstrate that
the problem has a natural Bayesian interpretation in terms of lack of condi-
tional exchangeability corresponding to model components. The null-robust re-
parametrization proposed by Robins and Wasserman (1997) as a correction to
this problem can similarly be understood as restoring the missing conditional
exchangeability. Proper understanding of the problem and the possible solutions
are are especially important given the recent renewed interest in the paramet-
ric g-computation formula (e.g. Taubman et al., 2009; Westreich et al., 2012;
Keil et al., 2014; Jain et al., 2016; Bijlsma et al., 2017; Neophytou et al., 2019;
Shahn et al., 2019).
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Appendix: Group-level exchangeability
Point treatment setting
We present a small numerical example to illustrate the difference between the
data generating mechanism O in Figure 1 and E in Figure 2. We simulate under
the null from the joint probability distribution P (Yi | xi, zi, ui)P (Zi | xi)P (Xi |
ui)P (Ui), where we take
Yi | (xi, zi, ui) ∼ Poisson(xi + exp{ui}) (no treatment effect),
Zi | xi ∼ Bernoulli(expit(γxi)) with γ = −0.25,
Xi ∼ Poisson(exp{ui}),
Ui ∼ N(0, 1).
Data generating mechanism E is obtained by taking γ = 0. Groups A and B
of size nA = nB = 250 were generated by successive draws from the above
probability distributions, and quota sampling (cf. McCullagh, 2008, p. 647),
taking the first nA units with Zi = 1 as A and the first nB units with Zi = 0
as B. The process was repeated 1000 times; the means and standard deviations
for the variables are given in Table 2. This demonstrates that the two groups
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A and B being compared are exchangeable under the completely randomized
setting E , while under the observational setting O the groups differ in their
characteristics, which will result in a spurious association if comparisons between
summary statistics T (YA) and T (YB) are made without accounting for the group
characteristics.
Table 2
Simulation from the data generating mechanisms corresponding to Figures 1 (γ = −0.25)
and 2 (γ = 0). The numbers are means (SDs) over 1000 replications.
γ Group Xi Ui Yi
-0.25 A 1.056 (1.443) -0.184 (0.916) 2.294 (2.904)
B 2.066 (2.921) 0.130 (1.035) 4.006 (5.648)
0 A 1.644 (2.444) -0.000 (0.999) 3.291 (4.740)
B 1.660 (2.488) 0.002 (1.002) 3.318 (4.806)
Longitudinal setting
We can illustrate the causal exchangeability considerations under the longitu-
dinal setting through considering the comparability of the groups A1 (Z1i =
1, Z2i = 1 ∀ i ∈ A1), A2 (Z1i = 1, Z2i = 0 ∀ i ∈ A2), A3 (Z1i = 0, Z2i = 1 ∀ i ∈
A3) and A4 (Z1i = 0, Z2i = 0 ∀ i ∈ A4). Again using quota sampling, we obtain
Al, l = 1, . . . , 4 with nAl = 500 from the joint distribution
P (Yi | xi, z1i, z2i, ui)P (Z2i | xi, z1i)P (Xi | ui, z1i)P (Z1i)P (Ui),
where we take
Yi | (xi, z1i, z2i, ui) ∼ Poisson(exp{ui}),
Z2i | (xi, z1i) ∼ Bernoulli (expit{γxi + z1i}) ,
Xi | (ui, z1i) ∼ Bernoulli (expit{−ui + 2z1i}) ,
Z1i ∼ Bernoulli(0.5),
Ui ∼ N(0, 1) and.
Under O, γ = −1 and under E , γ = 0. The simulation results are given in Table
3. It is apparent that the groups are not comparable under the observational
setting, since the distribution of Ui is different in the four groups. In the context
of the example, those assigned to treatment at the second interval are more likely
to be individuals with better underlying immune function status than those not
assigned to treatment, since the second assignment depends on Xi. Stratifying
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Table 3
Simulation from the data generating mechanisms corresponding to Figures 3 (γ = −1) and
4 (γ = 0). The numbers are means (SDs) over 1000 replications. Groups Aix, 1 = 1, . . . , 4
have been stratified for the value of x.
γ Group Xi Ui Yi
-1 A1 0.788 (0.409) 0.051 (1.011) 1.755 (2.636)
A2 0.910 (0.286) -0.057 (0.982) 1.525 (2.280)
A3 0.350 (0.477) 0.125 (0.991) 1.844 (2.687)
A4 0.594 (0.491) -0.079 (0.996) 1.526 (2.340)
A11 1.000 (0.000) -0.135 (0.950) 1.364 (1.956)
A21 1.000 (0.000) -0.137 (0.951) 1.358 (1.958)
A31 1.000 (0.000) -0.412 (0.910) 1.000 (1.499)
A41 1.000 (0.000) -0.413 (0.909) 1.003 (1.502)
A10 0.000 (0.000) 0.744 (0.925) 3.207 (4.020)
A20 0.000 (0.000) 0.743 (0.925) 3.206 (4.002)
A30 0.000 (0.000) 0.413 (0.910) 2.297 (3.050)
A40 0.000 (0.000) 0.412 (0.911) 2.296 (3.045)
0 A1 0.844 (0.362) 0.002 (1.000) 1.650 (2.483)
A2 0.844 (0.362) 0.002 (0.998) 1.651 (2.479)
A3 0.501 (0.500) 0.001 (0.999) 1.650 (2.494)
A4 0.501 (0.500) -0.002 (0.999) 1.646 (2.478)
A11 1.000 (0.000) -0.137 (0.952) 1.361 (1.963)
A21 1.000 (0.000) -0.136 (0.950) 1.361 (1.948)
A31 1.000 (0.000) -0.413 (0.909) 0.999 (1.500)
A41 1.000 (0.000) -0.413 (0.910) 1.003 (1.509)
A10 0.000 (0.000) 0.744 (0.925) 3.207 (4.020)
A20 0.000 (0.000) 0.743 (0.925) 3.206 (4.002)
A30 0.000 (0.000) 0.413 (0.910) 2.297 (3.050)
A40 0.000 (0.000) 0.412 (0.911) 2.296 (3.045)
the groups w.r.t. Xi does not result in comparable groups either because, for
instance, those without anemia and assigned to treatment at the first interval
are likely to have better immune function status than those without anemia and
no treatment at the first interval, since initiation of the treatment is in itself
a cause of anemia. However, stability holds, as can be seen by comparing the
distributions of Xi and Yi under O and E .
